'Constrained Discretion' in UK Monetary and Regional Policy by McVittie, Eric & Swales, J Kim
McVittie, Eric and Swales, J Kim (2004) 'Constrained Discretion' in UK 
Monetary and Regional Policy. Discussion paper. University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/67732/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
 STRATHCLYDE 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSTRAINED DISCRETION IN UK MONETARY AND REGIONAL 
POLICY 
 
BY 
 
ERIC MCVITTIE AND J KIM SWALES 
 
 
NO. 04-06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE 
GLASGOW 
  
Constrained Discretion in  
UK Monetary and Regional Policy 
 
 
 
Eric McVittie 
University of Plymouth Business School, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, 
e.mcvittie@plymouth.ac.uk 
J. Kim Swales  
Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde, 100 Cathedral St., Glasgow G4 
0LN, 
 j.k.swales@strath.ac.uk 
 
 
January 2004 
 
 
 The authors would like to thank Alex Christie, David Learmonth, Peter McGregor, 
Pauline McLaughlin and participants at the Regional Policy in the UK seminar, 
LSE, November 2003, organised by the ESRC Urban and Regional Economics 
Seminar Group, for comments on this and related work. Kim Swales also 
acknowledges financial support from the ESRC (grant L219252102) under the 
Devolution and Constitutional Change Research Programme.    
 
Abstract 
 
HM Treasury claims that the notion of Constrained Discretion which directs the 
effective operation of UK monetary policy applies equally to other delegated and 
devolved policies, such as the use of Regional Development Agencies in the delivery 
of UK regional policy. We question this claim from a transactions cost politics 
viewpoint. We argue that the delegation of responsibility for monetary stabilisation 
raises principal agent issues quite different to those encountered in the delegation 
of the responsibility for regional regeneration. Therefore the effectiveness and 
transparency that characterises present-day monetary policy cannot be expected in 
regional policy. Further, the detailed theoretical and empirical case for delegated 
Regional Development Agencies has yet to be made.  
 
JEL classification: E5, H1 and R5 
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 HM Treasury has argued for a new policy regime within the UK based on the 
delegation of decision making by central government to national, regional and local 
agencies. As the Chief Economic Advisor to HM Treasury, Ed Balls (2002) argues: 
[I]n the spirit of Bank of England independence and the new approach to regional 
policy, we now need a new devolution - a new localism - in public service delivery.   
The new regime follows the principle of constrained discretion, a term devised by 
Bernanke & Mishkin (1997) to describe monetary policy developments then 
occurring in a number of countries. Balls (2002) extends the terms reach, claiming 
that in the UK the constrained discretion model of policymaking has also had 
wider applicability across the public sector.  
 The central principles of this new regime are claimed to be: (1) Clear long-term 
goals set by elected government; (2) Clear division of responsibility and 
accountability for achieving those goals with proper coordination at the centre; (3) 
Maximum local flexibility and discretion; and (4) Maximum transparency about 
both goals and progress in achieving them, with proper scrutiny and accountability 
(Balls, 2002). In the context of UK monetary policy, constrained discretion refers to 
the operation of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In a regional policy setting, 
it is built around independent Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)  with 
expanded budgets and  100% flexibility  to spend the resources to meet regional 
priorities (Balls, 2002).1  
We have two major concerns with this policy stance. The first is the use by HM 
Treasury of a rhetorical device whereby the openness and effectiveness of the MPC 
in delivering monetary policy is employed to support the use of RDAs in delivering 
regional policy. As we will argue, macro-stabilisation and regional development pose 
quite different problems, so that independent agencies used to deliver each policy 
should operate in quite different ways (Wilson, 1989). The second is that the key 
characteristics of the policy of constrained discretion outlined in the previous 
paragraph, so admirably met by the MPC, are clearly not met by the RDAs. 
                                          
1 Allsopp (2003, p. 22) uses this notion of devolution with constrained discretion as a 
key element of the framework within which the present supply of UK regional statistics is to 
be reviewed.  
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However, we fear that HM Treasurys argument by analogy will restrict debate over 
the real strengths and weaknesses of the new regional policy and its prospects for 
success. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the general 
problem of government delegation to independent agencies in a principal-agent 
framework. We also give a summary of the contrasting characteristics of the 
problems of, and organisational detail surrounding, delegated regional and 
monetary policy delivery. Section 2 and 3 consider the operation of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) and the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in greater 
detail. Section 4 is a short conclusion.  
 
1. Delegated Policy Delivery: An Overview 
In tackling this issue we broadly adopt a transactions cost politics framework 
(North, 1990; Dixit, 1996). As the name suggests, this framework applies the ideas 
of transactions cost economics to the analysis of public policy institutions.   This 
should help identify, in detail, the co-ordination and motivation difficulties 
associated with different policy institutions and so provide a more solid foundation 
for evaluating alternative policy regimes. 
Within this perspective, we adopt a normative approach, seeking to identify the 
institutional setting for policy-making that would maximise the governments Social 
Welfare Function.2 From this viewpoint, there are a number of possible reasons for 
favouring the delivery of policy through an independent agency: for example, 
economies of specialisation, the additional flexibility of a non-Civil-Service work 
culture, or the greater commitment to a particular task shown by a more focused 
agency. However, in so far as the policy is delivered in this way, the government 
faces potential principal-agent problems. The existence of these problems depends 
on the extent to which the motives of the principal and agent coincide. Where 
motives are identical, principal-agent problems do not occur. However, where they 
                                          
2 We are aware that this bypasses the question of whether the Social Welfare Function is 
interpreted as reflecting simply the governments or societys interests (McVittie & Swales, 
2003). 
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differ, the agents actions and/or outputs need to be monitored and the appropriate 
incentive mechanisms installed (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). The extent and nature 
of the informational asymmetries and the ease of monitoring will affect the 
associated transactions costs and therefore overall policy effectiveness. 
Exhibit 1 briefly summarises the relevant features of the policies delivered 
through the MPC and the RDAs and important institutional and information issues 
in the operation of these agencies. This exhibit will be used as an aid  a road map 
even - when both of these delegated policies are discussed in greater detail in the 
next two sections. Note that in most respects the characteristics of the delegated 
monetary and regional policies identified in Exhibit 1 are quite different. This 
suggests a strong prima facie case against uncritically accepting the argument by 
analogy adopted by Balls. In this paper we investigate the similarities and 
differences between the two delegated policies in greater detail. In particular, we 
analyse the implications of these differences for the effectiveness and openness that 
will accompany the application of constrained discretion in the delivery of regional 
policy.  
 
2. The Monetary Policy Committee 
The new regime of constrained discretion in the operation of UK monetary 
policy was introduced during May 1997 and ratified under the Bank of England Act, 
1998. This Act delegates decisions on interest rate determination to the Banks 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). This committee, however, is answerable to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and constrained to act in pursuit of an inflation target 
that he or she sets.    
In terms of the central principles underlying the operation of constrained 
discretion outlined in the introduction: (1) The goal is macroeconomic stability, 
defined in terms of an inflation target; (2) Operational independence for the Bank 
of England provides for a clear division of responsibility between central government 
(HM Treasury) and the MPC, with the government responsible for political 
decisions (ends) and the MPC for technical decisions (means); (3) The Open Letter 
System allows the MPC to respond flexibly to macroeconomic shocks by affording 
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the opportunity to justify divergence from the inflation target3; and (4) Publishing 
the inflation target, the minutes of MPC meetings and the technical advice (Bank of 
England Inflation Reports, etc.) on which decisions were based secures transparency 
and accountability. 
The motivation for monetary policy reform is made clear in the New Labour 
manifesto commitment to  reform the Bank of England to ensure that decision-
making on monetary policy is more effective, open, accountable and free from short-
term political manipulation (Balls, 2001). The argument is extended in Balls (2002]:     
In todays global economy and fast-moving capital markets, responding flexibly and 
decisively to surprise economic events is critical for establishing a track record for 
delivering long-term stability.   But without a credible framework that commands trust 
and a track record for making the right decisions, it is hard for policy to respond 
flexibly without immediately raising the suspicion that the government is about to 
sacrifice long-term stability and make a short-term dash for growth.   So  we put in 
place a new and post-monetarist macroeconomic model based on constrained 
discretion   in which the government sets and is therefore constrained by the 
symmetric inflation target to stick to long-term goals; but because the institutional 
framework commands market credibility and public trust, the independent central 
bank has the discretion necessary to respond flexibly and transparently to economic 
events. 
 
2.1 Reasons for delegation to MPC 
The reform is a response to the well known time inconsistency problem.   In this 
view, an unconstrained governments commitment to a low inflation policy is not 
credible because if the commitment were believed, the subsequent pursuit of such a 
policy would be sub-optimal for the government (Barro & Gordon, 1983; Kydland & 
                                          
3 In the presence of unanticipated shocks, attempts to meet the inflation target might 
cause undesirable volatility in output HM Treasury (2003). However, if inflation moves 
more than 1%, in either direction, away from its target, the Governor of the Bank of England 
has to send a letter to the Chancellor. This letter must outline the reasons, policy actions, 
expected response time scale and the way in which these actions are consistent with the 
governments monetary policy objectives.  
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Prescott, 1977).4   Government is tempted to renege on any commitment to a low 
inflation stance by exploiting the short-run output-inflation trade off. 
If expected inflation is low, an expansionary monetary policy generates higher 
short-run output (lower unemployment) at a low cost in terms of additional 
inflation.   The public is, however, aware that government faces this incentive and 
therefore expects that any low inflation commitment will not be adhered to. The 
result is a higher expected and actual equilibrium inflation rate determined where 
the marginal cost of additional inflation outweighs the marginal benefit of additional 
output that would accompany an unanticipated monetary shock. If the government 
cannot credibly commit to a low inflation rate, therefore, it must accept higher 
equilibrium inflation with no improvement in output or (un)employment. 
The central problem here is moral hazard in the relationship between the public, 
acting as the principal, and the government, acting as the agent. Through hidden 
actions or hidden information, the government can exploit the difficulty the public 
has in accurately interpreting monetary policy actions. But because the public 
knows that it is in this weak position it anticipates the worst. With the MPC an 
institution is introduced that limits the governments options, thereby removing the 
moral hazard. However, the use of an agency to reduce moral hazard is unusual. In 
most circumstances, agency relationships, by introducing additional layers of 
interaction, are accompanied by increased moral hazard. 
 
2.2 Alignment of motives 
The organisational details surrounding the MPC support its independence from 
government pressure and its adoption of a long-run inflation target as the central 
goal of monetary policy. However, the specific nature of the policy problem allows 
the agency solution to be particularly effective. Moreover the central, and perhaps 
most attractive, characteristics of the operation of the MPC - the clarity, openness 
and accountability of the decision-making process - are similarly dependent upon 
the very special circumstances associated with this policy problem. In particular, 
                                          
4 In other words, the low inflation outcome is not a Nash equilibrium of the appropriate 
game (Gibbons, 1992, p. 112-115). 
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for the MPC there is no conflict between policy effectiveness and openness. This is 
very unusual.  
One key point is that the difference between the governments and the MPCs 
interests seems remarkably small. First, many of the members of the Monetary 
Policy Committee have a part-time, short-term tenure. The job that they perform  
accurately predicting future trends in inflation and the impact of varying monetary 
policy on these trends  is one for which they would wish to build (or maintain) an 
individual outside reputation as a source of income and prestige. They therefore 
have no incentive to distort their views about these issues, and the benchmark 
competition generated by the disclosure of the MPC minutes and voting encourage 
high effort.5 
Second, there is a high level of agreement within the population over the goals of 
monetary policy. This policy unanimity is unusual within government. Dixit (1997, 
p. 378) points to a very important, almost defining, distinct feature of public 
organizations: they are answerable to several different constituencies with different 
objectives.   The presence of multiple principals raises the potential for moral 
hazard, costly influence activities and even destructive competition between various 
interest groups vying to influence the policy agenda and the distribution of funds 
(Dixit, 1996, 1997; Frank & Cook, 1995; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986, 1990; Stiglitz, 
1998; and Wilson, 1989). The independence of the MPC is therefore supported by 
this agreement over policy ends. For the MPC, the problem and its solution appear 
to be purely technical. 
 Further, if there were major disagreement within the population over the 
appropriate goals of monetary policy, it is doubtful whether the MPC could operate 
in such a transparent manner. Governments are well aware of the truth of the 
words of Francis Bacon (1597): For also knowledge itself is power. Where the 
relative costs or benefits of a particular policy goal are in dispute, it is natural that 
the government will wish to control the flow of information to the electorate in order 
to bolster support for its own policy. Given that it is generally difficult to make a 
clear division between policy means and ends, the government would not welcome 
                                          
5 One problem might be the participation constraint, though salary, prestige and access 
to information are clearly adequate to attract high quality applicants. Also insider trading is 
possible but is relatively easy to police, given the high profile of MPC members.   
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completely open and candid discussion by their chosen policy intermediary. But in 
this case, the lack of candour would not only reduce openness but also weaken the 
credibility of the MPC and therefore the effectiveness of the policy delivery. 
 
2.3 Ease of Monitoring 
The credibility of the MPC is increased because its policy actions are effectively 
monitored. In order to limit public concern about monetary expansions being used 
to affect short-run increases in activity, the operation of monetary policy needs to 
be visible and clear. Meeting these requirements is aided by the fact that the MPC 
uses only one policy instrument, the interest rate, whose level is set solely to hit the 
single objective, the inflation rate target.6 In other words, the effectiveness of the 
policy gains as a result of its not being joined up. Similarly, the relationship 
between these variables is believed to be well understood and the thinking behind 
any discretionary behaviour is explained openly in the MPCs published minutes. 
Further, accurate and timely measurement of the target policy variable increases 
credibility and is crucial for accountability. The inflation rate target is symmetric 
and has, up to now, been attained.  
Alternative strategies can be used to establish credible price stability. One is to 
use binding policy rules (Friedman, 1960). However, past experience suggests that 
these are necessarily inflexible and therefore incapable of dealing adequately with 
macroeconomic shocks (Balls. 2001). Alternatively, the Government might seek to 
establish a reputation for a low inflation stance.  But this takes time, and might 
only be won at substantial cost in terms of lower output and higher unemployment 
whilst expectations adjust to the new regime.  Delegation of monetary policy 
decisions represents an alternative response to the credibility problem that allows 
more flexibility than with a centralised regime.   Theory suggests - and a substantial 
body of recent evidence confirms - that such mechanisms can secure greater 
                                          
6 Under Section 11 of the Bank of England Act, 1998, the Bank is instructed to follow 
lexicological objectives in the operation of monetary policy. Its primary objective is to 
maintain price stability. Subject to that, monetary policy should support the governments 
wider economic aims, including objectives on growth and employment. The inflation rate 
target is the only objective that specifically binds.  
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macroeconomic stability with lower inflation (Blinder, 2000; Chortareas et al, 2001; 
Romer, 1993). 
However, two important points need to be stressed before recommending the 
MPC as a suitable role model for other forms of policy delegation. The first is that 
for the MPC, the effectiveness, openness, accountability and freedom from short-
term political manipulation are characteristics that reinforce one another (Faust & 
Svensson, 2001). In order for the operation of the MPC to be effective, it must be 
free from short-term political manipulation. And for this policy freedom to be 
credible, the MPC must be open and accountable. There is no conflict or tension 
between these policy characteristics.  
Second, it misleading to think that delegation to the MPC involves a reduction in 
Treasury control over macro-stability. In the UK system, monetary policy objectives 
are determined by government and are subject to revision.   Moreover, Section 19 of 
Bank of England Act, 1998, gives HM Treasury legal authority to take back 
operational control of monetary policy. This can occur if it is judged by the 
Chancellor, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank (and subsequent 
ratification by Parliament), to be required in the public interest and by extreme 
economic circumstances.  The MPC is simply an effective way for the government 
to deliver its macro-stability objectives. 
 
3. Regional Development Agencies 
Balls (2002) makes the case for extending constrained discretion to other 
areas of government activity, of which regional policy is a prominent example, by 
an analogy with the perceived success of the monetary policy arrangements. In 
the case of regional policy constrained discretion takes the form of increased 
decentralisation of policy making from central government to regional and local 
agencies. It most clearly applies to the English Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs). 
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The English RDAs were set up as non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) 
under the Regional Development Agencies Act, 1998.7 They were formally 
launched in eight English regions on 1 April 1999. A ninth, in London, was 
established in July 2000 following the formation of the Greater London 
Authority. The RDAs have statutory duties to encourage economic development 
and regeneration; promote business efficiency, investment and competitiveness; 
promote employment; enhance development and application of skills relevant to 
employment; and contribute to sustainable development in each of the English 
regions.   To these statutory duties have since been added roles in the areas of 
tourism promotion, transportation, housing and planning. 
We again use the structure of Exhibit 1 to characterise regional policy delivery 
through the RDAs. We focus, in particular, on potential principal-agent problems. 
Before starting it is perhaps useful to note that the extreme clarity of the issues 
surrounding monetary stability in general, and the operation of the MPC in 
particular, is missing from similar discussion of regional policy and the RDAs. 
Bearing this in mind, we begin with the motives for delegating the delivery of 
regional policy through the RDAs. 
 
3.1 Reasons for Delegation to RDAs 
The principal argument for increased localism in the field of regional policy is 
that this will allow regional and local agencies to design and implement local 
solutions to local problems. As HM Treasury et al (2003, p. 1] state: 
A close examination of national and regional economies shows that, the main cause of 
disparities is differences in productivity.   It also shows that there is no single reason for 
underperformance and the effectiveness of factors driving productivity, such as skills, 
                                          
7 Development Agencies generally have a much longer track record in the Devolved 
Administrations. The Highlands and Islands Development Board was created in 1965 and 
the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies in 1975. These agencies were dissolved in 
1990 and their powers transferred to, and extended within, new statutory bodies. In 
Scotland, these bodies adopted new names, Highland and Island Enterprise and Scottish 
Enterprise. Invest Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland development agency, was created 
in 2002.   
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investment and enterprise, vary from area to area.   This implies that the approach 
required for addressing market failures should be capable of addressing regional, as well 
as national, needs.  
Thus the new localism in regional policy sees the roots of regional disparities in 
myriad small-scale coordination and market failures. HM Treasury (2001, p. v) 
states: 
The challenge for Government therefore is to help tackle these failures, so as to allow 
those less successful regions to build the conditions for economic success, whilst 
ensuring that more successful regions and countries continue to flourish. 
This, it is argued, requires greater flexibility since the policy response will depend 
on the precise nature of specific market failures and how they interact with 
imperfections in other markets at the appropriate spatial scale (local, regional, 
national, international).   To operate such a policy centrally would impose an 
enormous strain on the governments ability to gather and process information and 
to design and deliver appropriate policy responses. Thus HM Treasury et al. (2003, p.  
4) claim that delegation of regional policy will 
maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of policy by allowing policy design to draw on 
the expertise and knowledge of local and regional agents  [and by]  improving the 
ability of government to facilitate the development of locally differentiated solutions and 
better target policy delivery . 
These are the standard arguments for decentralised decision-making based on 
improved information acquisition and processing. However, note that they are not, 
in themselves, arguments for delegating to an independent agency or agencies. 
Such a policy could be delivered by setting up regional offices of the appropriate 
national ministries. In order to justify policy delegation a more detailed argument is 
required. A concern over the delegation of regional policy is that this more detailed 
debate has never taken place. Further, whilst informational asymmetries underlie 
the arguments for delegation to both the MPC and RDAs, the issues are very 
different. The RDAs are put forward as an institutional innovation to optimise the 
use of spatially dispersed information, whilst the MPC is a mechanism to eliminate 
the abuse of organisationally dispersed information. The two problems are quite 
distinct. 
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One possible reason for the delegation of regional policy delivery is that whilst in 
general the government values the explicit and tacit codes of practice adopted by 
the Civil Service, it wants a different working culture for the RDAs. In particular, 
RDA employees might be encouraged to be more risk-taking, pro-active and private-
sector friendly than Civil Servants in HM Treasury or the Department of Trade and 
Industry.8 This is likely if the government wants the RDAs to introduce innovative 
local policies, not just to operate national discretionary policies. However, whether 
this culture will produce a more or less transparent policy-making process is not 
clear to us. 
A second possibility is that the government wants to use benchmark competition 
to increase the effectiveness of regional policy. Here, having multiple, separately 
accountable, agencies would be a way of combating some of the moral hazard 
problems (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). HM Treasury et al (2003, p. 4) argue: 
It is also necessary to maintain channels to facilitate communication and the spread 
of best practice between the nations and regions, and to assist policy coordination.  
The Government argues that these institutions will facilitate the ability to benchmark 
regional and local performance - which improves the monitoring of these [devolved] 
bodies by local and national electorates.   This enhances the incentives to increase the 
efficiency of public service delivery and encourages the adoption of innovative policy 
solutions.  
Such a source for improving the delivery of policy might be very valuable. However, 
again note that this kind of argument is quite different to those used to justify 
delegating monetary policy to the MPC. Further, in so far as the regions do face 
genuinely different problems that require specific local knowledge to identify the 
optimal solution, the benchmarking process is limited and potentially unfair in its 
application.9 
                                          
8 The difference in behaviour is likely to reflect both the internal procedures in place in 
the different organisations and the level of risk aversion of their employees.  
9 For a more detailed discussion of the pitfalls involved in such comparisons, see Royal 
Statistical Society Working Party on Performance Monitoring in Public Services (2003, pp. 
17-18) 
 12
Finally, in considering the motives for the delegation of regional policy delivery, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether credibility (or time-consistency) is a problem. 
Clearly credibility issues might arise in the context of regional policy because, as 
Stiglitz (1998, pp. 9-10) points out, credibility is a general, indeed inherent, 
problem for government.     
Government is the primary enforcer of contracts.   It uses its monopoly on the legal 
use of force to create the possibility of private commitment.   There is no one, however, 
whose job is to guard the guardian.   The government cannot make a commitment 
because it always has the possibility of changing its mind, and earlier agreements 
cannot be enforced. 
But credibility is much less important for regional policy than it is for monetary 
policy. The effectiveness of policy to attract relocating plants, and in particular 
foreign direct investment, might be enhanced by a credible commitment to ongoing 
support. In this respect, the decision by Scottish Enterprise, the RDA for Scotland,  
to set up Locate In Scotland  an agency within an agency  might have been partly 
motivated by such considerations. However, these policies are only part of the 
functions that RDAs perform and corresponding time-consistency issues carry 
much less weight than for the MPC.  
 
3.2 Alignment of Motives 
A necessary condition for moral hazard problems is that principal and agent have 
interests that are not fully aligned. In considering the moral hazard raised by the 
operation of the MPC, we identified two particular sources of potential problems. 
These were the extent to which the interests of the agency as an organisation and 
the interests of the key decision-makers in the agency are aligned with those of the 
government. An associated issue is the degree of more general political agreement 
over the specific policy goals.  We argued that the openness and efficiency of the 
delegated monetary policy delivery would be reduced if there were political 
disagreement over monetary policy goals.  
In investigating the operation of independent RDAs, the fact that regional policy 
delivery has been delegated to a number of agencies, each covering a distinct 
geographical area, is an important institutional detail. The interests of an individual 
RDA will primarily concern the level of economic activity within its own geographic 
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area. However, the interests of the government concern the national level of activity 
and its distribution across regions. The interests of an individual RDA are therefore 
only, at best, partly aligned with those of the government. Each RDA has an 
interest, for example, in getting a bigger share of the programme budget, 
independently of the opportunity cost. Individual RDAs will also give low weight to 
policy spill-overs to other parts of the country. 
The role of the temporary members of the MPC is to provide knowledge and 
judgement over the operation of monetary policy. These skills are valuable in the 
wider economy and the MPC an ideal platform for advertising ones abilities. For the 
MPC the motives of the members and the government are aligned and the members 
will favour transparency. However, managers of RDAs manage, so that there are 
familiar effort issues. Further, the criteria used in their assessment will depend 
much more heavily on the perceived performance of the RDAs as organisations. As 
such, the chief executives of RDAs have an incentive to bury the bad news and 
showcase the good, and will clearly resist complete transparency in decision 
making and policy execution. In this the RDAs are similar to almost all 
organisations. It is the MPC that is the outlier. Any lack of transparency in the 
operation of RDAs is reinforced by the requirement for commercial confidentiality 
that accompanies much of the discretionary aid that they manage. 
Given that political activity is already organised on a geographic basis, with 
individual Members of Parliaments representing spatially defined constituencies, 
there is an inherent lack of political unanimity over the goals of regional policy. This 
increases the potential moral hazard problems, particularly if the RDAs operate 
closely with local private firms and public institutions, as the government wishes 
them to do. There will be pressure on the RDAs to attempt to subvert the national 
ends of regional policy by distorting the local means by which the policy is achieved. 
Issues of corruption might also emerge (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Of course, all of 
this also undermines the potential openness of the delegated policy delivery. If 
RDAs see themselves as competing with one another - to attract inward investment, 
for example, or in overt benchmark competition  they will not be completely 
transparent in their policy actions or deliberations. 
However, independently of the conflict between national policy objectives and the 
local concerns of individual RDAs, there is also no consensus over the national 
aims of regional policy. The current governments approach is to focus on improving 
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economic performance in all regions by addressing local market and co-ordination 
failures.   The policy thus avoids any explicit concern with spatial re-distribution, 
leading some writers, e.g. Wren (2001), to question whether it is a regional policy as 
normally construed.  This has not, however, settled the debate on policy objectives, 
since disagreements remain over whether regional policy should be redistributive 
(and, if so, in what ways) and on the appropriate weights to be given to various 
policy objectives, as is clear from House of Commons (2003).   
 
3.3 Ease of Monitoring 
Some difference between the interests of the principal and agent(s) is a necessary 
condition for moral hazard. However, the moral hazard problem can often be 
alleviated if the agents actions and/or the outcomes of those actions can be 
monitored.  The case of the MPC is an ideal type in this regard. The formal goal of 
the agency is clear and the outcome is easily and rapidly monitored. Policy actions 
are straightforwardly identified and interpreted. Finally the operation of monetary 
policy does not need to be adjusted to take into account other policy aims or 
accommodate other policy actions. Unfortunately, none of these conditions apply to 
the RDAs. 
The problem for regional policy begins with the identification of policy targets. In 
this case, for accountability there needs to be clear targets for the overall operation 
of regional policy and also consistent targets for individual RDAs. HM Treasury et al 
(2003, pp. 4-5] are aware of the problem: 
Effective policy responses need to combine actions at national, regional and local 
levels to best effect.   Policies which are best determined for the whole of the UK, but 
impact across all nations and regions, should be designed these impacts in mind (sic).   
At the same time, policies developed and delivered by national, regional and local 
bodies must be properly coordinated.   Suitable mechanisms to turn high level 
decisions at the centre into specific actions on the ground, taking account of the 
differing roles and responsibilities of all those involved in all localities, are an essential 
part of the process. 
However, regional policy targets are vaguely defined objectives that are often 
closely related (i.e. joined-up) with those of other areas of policy.   The Public 
Service Agreement targets for regional policy over the period 2003-2006 are to 
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[m]ake sustainable improvements in the economic performance of all English regions 
and over the long term reduce the persistent gap in growth rates between regions, 
defining measures to improve performance and reporting progress against these 
measures by 2006 [HM Treasury, 2002, p. 25]. 
Whether this represents a statement of clear long-term goals - one of the central 
requirements of constrained discretion - is highly debatable. For example, as 
Allsopp (2003, p. 21) points out, data currently do not exist to calculate the real 
regional GDP growth rates. These PSA targets are, however, models of clarity when 
compared with the goals set for agencies - in particular the English RDAs - to which 
responsibility for design and delivery of this policy is delegated. These are outlined 
in Exhibit 2. They include: improving trend growth in GDP per capita; reducing 
deprivation in deprived wards; promoting urban and rural development; promoting 
physical development; increasing employment; improving skills relevant to 
employment; encouraging enterprise and innovation; increasing investment and 
productivity; sustainability; and so on. In sum, the objectives of regional policy, as 
currently identified, are unclear and imprecise in a way that those for monetary 
policy are not.  
Even if it were the case that the RDAs targets were expressed in a tighter, more 
specific and measurable manner, the degree of accountability would be much lower 
than for the MPC. This is because of the extended time frame over which these 
targets are set and the lack of agreement over the causal links between public 
policy and local development. Imagine that when the regional data become 
available, it is judged that the persistent gap between regional growth rates had not 
been reduced over the 2002-2006 time period. Who would be accountable? The 
then serving relevant minister(s) and RDA chief executives, or those who had held 
these offices in the past? 
 This problem is increased because it is difficult to monitor the RDAs actions or 
to decide whether the actions are appropriate ex ante. Of course, the lack of 
agreement of the determinants of regional development in general will make 
identifying the counterfactual  what would have occurred had there been no 
regional policy  uncertain, so that even ex post evaluations with clear targets will 
face difficulties (McVittie & Swales, 2003; Taylor, 2002). 
The problems for efficiency and transparency are exacerbated by the high level of 
interaction between RDAs and other agencies operating at the local level. Even if it 
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were possible to identify, in an accurate and timely manner, the overall impact of 
local development policy, is it possible to assign success or failure to individual 
agencies? 
Caffyn and Lutz (2002) discuss the present institutional framework for the local 
delivery of tourism policy in the UK and indicate the practical implications of 
joined up policies. At the regional level there are five organisations with some 
responsibility for tourism policy. These are: the Regional Tourist Boards, the 
Regional Chambers; the Government Offices for the Regions; the Regional 
Development Agencies and the Regional Cultural Consortia. These regional bodies 
are responsible to different Government Departments and interact at a more local 
level with local authorities, partnership organisations and the tourism industry. The 
situation is shown graphically in Exhibit 3 (Caffyn and Lutz, 2002, Figure 1, p. 5). It 
is unclear to us how in practice the contribution of any of these separate 
institutions can be individually identified. Of course, tourism promotion is only one 
of the concerns of the RDAs.  
Before concluding, it is important to raise the issue of transparency and regional 
accountability. In the case of the MPC, there is a clear distinction between means 
and ends: the MPC has independence concerning the operation of monetary policy 
but the Chancellor sets the clear inflation target. Whilst the operation of monetary 
policy is now more transparent, there is no presumption of increased democracy, 
aside from the fact that the electorate might become better informed over policies 
aimed at macroeconomic stability. 
 However, with the delegation of regional policy, RDAs will be held properly to 
account  within the region and by local government (Balls, 1992, p.7). 
Transparency and accountability is linked to local democracy in a rather imprecise 
way, blurring the distinction, earlier argued as critical, between the ends (set by the 
elected government) and means (determined by the independent agency) of 
delegated policies. RDAs in the Devolved Administrations of Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales report not to UK government departments but to their 
Parliament and Assemblies. For these agencies, power has been devolved not simply 
delegated. For them, neither the ends nor the means are under direct UK 
government control. But if the English RDAs are to be subject to local democratic 
influences, is this simply concerning how policy should work, but not why and for 
whom? 
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 Conclusions 
In this paper we question the view presented by Ed Balls (2002) that the 
efficiency and transparency apparent in the constrained discretion operated by of 
the Monetary Policy Committee would be replicated by the Regional Development 
Agencies. His attempt to argue by analogy is particularly inappropriate: the policy 
problems posed by macroeconomic stabilisation and regional development are 
completely different. Whilst it might be optimal to deal with both through delegated 
agencies, the detailed case and empirical evidence have been presented for 
monetary policy but not regional development. Further, the four key characteristics 
of the operation of constrained discretion listed in the introduction, whilst applying 
to the MPC do not apply to RDAs. We have expressed concern elsewhere about the 
increasing difficulty of regional policy evaluation (McVittie & Swales, 2003). If the 
government wants to ensure the transparent and efficient delivery of regional policy 
it needs to look carefully and critically at the institutions it is putting in place. A 
much more realistic debate needs to take place concerning the strengths and 
weaknesses of such a delegated policy.   
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Exhibit 1:  Features of UK Delegated Monetary and Regional Policy 
 Monetary Policy 
Committee 
Regional Development 
Agencies 
Reason for Delegation Moral Hazard by 
Government (Time 
Inconsistency) 
Information? 
Alignment of Motives 
      Number of agencies One Several 
      Organisational Alignment Full  Partial 
      Managerial Alignment High Low 
      Electoral Agreement High Low 
Ease of Monitoring 
      Number of Objectives One Many 
      Number of Policy Instruments One Many 
      Target Symmetric Aspirational? 
      Status of Policy Impact Model Well Understood Poorly Understood 
      Feedback Rapid Slow 
      Integration of Policy Isolated Joined Up 
 
Exhibit 2 RDA Target Framework   
   
Tier 1 Objectives Tier 2 Regional Outcomes (by 2004/5 unless otherwise stated) Tier 3 Core Milestones (Outputs) 
 
Apply throughout urban and rural areas 
 
These are national targets.   Targets for each region will be set through the corporate planning
process. 
 
The numbers on these targets will differ regionally.   These will 
be set through the corporate planning process.   RDAs to 
produce a written commentary which describes how these 
milestones impact on their Tier 2 targets. 
 
To promote economic development and 
regionally balanced growth. 
1. Sustainable economic performance: Provide a strategic framework to improve the 
sustainable economic performance of each region, measured by the trend in growth of GVA 
per capita, while also contributing to the broader quality of life of the region. 
 
1. Employment Opportunities: Support the creation or 
safeguarding of x net jobs. 
To promote social cohesion and sustainable 
development through integrated local 
regeneration programmes 
2. Regeneration: Work with Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and other stakeholders to 
achieve neighbourhood renewal through promoting economic development and investment in 
the most deprived areas.   In doing so, to reduce deprivation by 10% in those wards in the 
region that are currently in the bottom 20% of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation, thereby 
contributing to a narrowing of the gap between these wards and the mean of all wards. 
2. Brownfield Land: Reclaim or remediate x hectares of 
previously developed land and buildings as a contribution to 
the national target, shared between all RDAs, the LDA and 
English Partnerships, to reclaim previously developed land and 
buildings at a rate of over 1,400 hectares per annum by 2006 
(reclaiming 10% of the estimated 2000 stock by 2006 and 20% 
by 2010. 
 
To help those without a job into work by 
promoting employment and enhancing the 
development of skills relevant to employment 
3. Urban: Working with partners, including LSPs, contribute the the renaissance of towns and 
cities, enhancing the quality of space and buildings through the promotion of excellence in 
design by co-ordinating the RES with regional transport plans, regional planning guidance, 
regional sustainable tourism and local development plans. 
 
3. Education and Skills: Support the creation of learning 
opportunities for x individuals. 
Promote enterprise, innovation, increased 
productivity and competitiveness. 
4. Rural: Reduce the gap in productivity between the least well performing quartile of rural 
areas and the English median by 2006, and improve the accessibility of services for rural 
people.   Regenerate vulnerable market towns as healthy and attractive centres serving their 
own population and that of their rural hinterlands. 
 
4. Business Performance: Support the creation and/or 
attraction of x new businesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Physical Development: Work with partners to achieve a more sustainable balance between 
housing availability and the demand for housing in all English regions, and to ensure that by 
2008, 60% of new housing is provided in previously developed land and through conversion of
existing buildings. 
 
5. Investment benefiting deprived areas: Leverage through 
RDA funding and activity x pounds private sector investment 
benefiting residents of the most deprived wards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Employment: Work with partners to increase the ILO employment rate over the economic 
cycle. 
 
 
Strategic Added Value: Mobile the actions of key regional and 
sub-regional partners to support the achievement of regional 
priorities and deliver agreed regional strategies (still needs 
developing). 
 
 
RDA Target Framework (cont)  
 
 
Tier 1 Objectives Tier 2 Regional Outcomes (by 2004/5 unless otherwise stated) Tier 3 Core Milestones (Outputs) 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Skills: Work with LSCs, Sector Skills Councils and other partners, to improve the levels of 
qualifications of the workforce in order to meet priorities as defined in Regional Frameworks 
for Employment and Skills and to help meet national learning targets. 
 
 
 
Supplementary Milestones: Each RDA will also agree 
supplementary milestones which will vary regionally. 
 8. Productivity: Work with regional partners to enable an increase in productivity measured by 
Gross Value Added (GVA) per hour worked in the region. 
 
 
 9. Enterprise: Work with Small Business Service and others to help build an enterprise society 
in which small firms of all kinds thrive and achive their potential, with an increase in the 
number of people considering going into business, an improvement in the overall productivity 
of small firms, and more enterprise in disadvantaged communities. 
 
 
 10. Investment: Make the region an attractive place for investment to maintain the UK as the 
prime location in the EU for foreign direct investment, particularly by providing effective co-
ordination of inward investment activities of regional and local partners. 
 
 
  11. Innovation: Make the most of the UK's science, engineering and technology by increasing 
the level of exploitation of technological knowledge derived from the science and engineering 
base, as demonstrated by a significant increase in the number of innovating businesses, of 
whom a growing proportion use the science base amongst other sources of knowledge. 
 
  
   
Source: Department of Trade and Industry   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The acronyms used in Exhibit 3 are as follows: DCMS is the Department of Culture 
Media and Sport; DEFRA is the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs; DTI 
is the Department of Trade and Industry; ETC is the English Tourism Council; GOR is the 
Government Offices of the Regions; ODPM is the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; 
RC is Regional Chambers; RCC is Regional Cultural Consortia; RCU is the Regional Co-
ordination Unit; RDA is the Regional Development Agency; and RTB is the Regional 
Tourist Board; 
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